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Abstract
In this paper we present a trust management scheme, derived from the
horizontal and almost anarchic Web of Trust model, but following a cu-
ratorship step that allows it to become a centerpiece for authentication in
Debian, one of the largest and longest lived free software projects and pro-
ducer of the eponymous GNU/Linux software distribution. This is done
by analizing the experience gained through a large-scale key migration
process that spanned five years and nearly 100% of the originally existing
keys, carried out attempting to minimize loss of keyring connectivity and
strength, while keeping up to date with the best current security practices.
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1 Introduction
The Debian project, creator of the Debian GNU/Linux distribution, is among
the largest and longest lived free software projects. It is a completely volunteer-
driven, community-run project, with a very big geographic dispersion. Due to
the project’s very nature, it requires the use of strong cryptographic mechanisms
throughout its infrastructure.
The advent of public key cryptography in the late 1970s can be clearly seen as
a gamechanger. Particularly, the breakdown of the different security properties
that cryptography provides, and encryption, identity assessment and message
signing abilities are separate parts of the cryptographic universe, and no longer
just inferred by the knowledge of a given symmetric key.
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Keeping public key cryptography useful for years after a key is created is
feasible, however, the key strength is strongly affected by available computing
power: As computers grow more powerful, solving problems deemed too hard
only ten years ago is within reach; all of the desired properties of a cryptographic
key grow weaker with time as its keylength (formally analogous to a security
parameter, measured in bits) falls within reach of its potential attackers. Such
is the case in public key cryptography: While fifteen years ago the standard
recommended key length was 1024 bits, today forging a key of such length is
within reach of large organizations or national governments, and the minimum
recommended standard is 2048 bits (being 4096 preferred).
Large-scale migrations can be however very hard to achieve, as keys must be
accompanied by identity verification. For some settings, this issue is solved by
placing the burden of repeated identity assurance on the individual key holder
(and not of the certification entity).
Debian’s identity management scheme is based on the horizontal Web-
of-Trust (WoT) model, instead of the hierarchic Certificate Authorities in
widespread use in the commercial world, but it has what we define as a cu-
rated keyring. The need of a large-scale key migration, affecting at some point
almost 100% of the existing keys, was detected back in 2009, but delayed due
to its complexity and the degradation it would cause in the project keyring’s
strength. By late 2013 the situation remained bleak, with only close to 30% of
the keys having migrated.
Through aggressive deadlines and social work, the migration was completed
by early 2015; while over 200 keys were cut off the project, we argue this
corresponds mostly to keys of already inactive developers and helps bring the
project’s security in line with reality.
This paper presents the situation at greater depth in Sections 2, 3 and 4,
delineating the main points in the process, and presents as our results the closing
numbers per year after the hard-migration was finalized. Finally, we present
a proposed plan of action with prospective measures for future strengthening
work.
2 Preliminaries
This Section illustrates several basic concepts to understand the problematic
and development of the problem being studied.
2.1 Trust models in public key cryptography
Secure communications are possible in large-scale, open networks such as the
Internet thanks to public key cryptography, a group of algorithms that allow
two related numbers –the private key, that should be jealously guarded by each
communicating party, and the public key, that can be publicly disclosed– to
provide the assurance of integrity and confidentiality in communications.
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There are many algorithms based on this idea; for many decades, the most
commonly used one have been built on modular arithmetics — RSA (Rivest,
Shamir, and Adleman 1978) and DSA (FIPS 1994–2013); there are several al-
terntive algorithms with interesting properties that could end up replacing them
in the future, such as Elliptic Curves (Koblitz 1987; Miller 1986), but thanks to
their relative simplicity and to the large install base of compatible implementa-
tions, the aforementioned algorithms will probably remain dominant for a long
time.
However, while said algorithms solve the issue of communicating two end-
points that have already verified each other’s identity, in order to be used in
today’s networks there needs a way for keys to be communicated, and for their
identity to be trusted. Thanks to the introduction of public key distribution
systems (Merkle 1978; Diffie and Hellman 1976), it is possible for two parties
to securely exchange their keys in an open network. However, a determined at-
tacker can intercept communications prior to the key exchange and impersonate
either party while communicating to the other — an attack known as a Man in
the Middle or MitM.
This is where Public Key Infrastructure trust models come into play: As a
given key can come from legitimate or fraudulent parties, a key can be certified
with the signature of a trusted third party. There are two major trust models:
Certificate Authorities (CAs) A centralized, hierarchical model, based on
ultimately trusted agents (Housley et al. 1999; Yee 2013). Users trust a
set of root certificate authorities, and every certificate that is presented
should have a trust path leading to one such source of ultimate trust.
This is the most widely deployed model, used for the SSL/TLS protocols,
which includes all of the encrypted Web traffic (Durumeric et al. 2013).
This model is mostly apt for client-server communications, where usually
the only meaningful identity that has to be established is the server’s, while
the clients can connect anonymously, or authenticate via third methods,
usually communicated over the established encrypted channel.
Web of trust (WoT) A much less used and studied model; this is a decentral-
ized model, where there is no ultimate trust defined at any point. Trust
paths are also used, but instead of trust flowing down from few authori-
ties, it steams up from each of the system’s users: Every acting entity in
the system can validate the identity of some of its peers, and will trust a
given key based on all of the other people that trust it as well (Network
Associates, Inc. 1990–1999; Abdul-Rahman 1997).
This model is mainly used in the OpenPGP systems, used originally for
e-mail privacy and certification; this model is horizontal, in the sense that
every sender is also a receiver, and identity validation is usually carried
out in both directions at different points in time.
PGP, the first OpenPGP implementation and still a reference, was meant
for e-mail (Zimmerman 1991), but given that its encryption and/or signa-
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ture covers arbitrary static documents, it has been adopted for many other
uses, as it will be shown here.
Every user of said trust models needs to have a list of the trust sources in
use. In the WoT model, the set of keys through which operations are carried
out –both for trust assessment or for any other cryptographic operations– is
known as a keyring.
2.2 Cryptographic key length
The basic operation for public-key cryptosystems was defined back in the mid
to late 1970s on different algorithms, and their oldest implementations still in
widespread use (Phil Zimmerman’s Pretty Good Privacy, best known as PGP)
dates from 1991 (Zimmerman 1991; Back 2001). The PGP implementation is
very flexible; it allows its cryptographic material to be implemented through
different protocols. The main algorithms that have been historically used with
PGP are RSA and DSA; recent versions have added support for elliptic curve-
based algorithms, but they are not yet in widespread use.
When said cryptosystems underwent a standarization process for industry
and general public use, the National Institute for Standards and Technology
(NIST) specified several algorithms acceptable for message signatures as part of
the Digital Signature Standard (FIPS 1994–2013) — particularly, RSA (based
on the integer factorization problem, Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman 1978) and
DSA (based on the discrete logarithm problem and based on ElGamal 1985).
Both the integer factorization and the discrete logarithm varieties are based
on trapdoor permutations, that is, functions that are much easier to perform in
one direction than in the inverse without the knowledge of special information
(the trapdoor).
In both cases, however, defining work as much easier to do is necessarily
flexible: As more computing power is available, both the public and secret
parts of said computation have to be much larger to resist factorization — this
is known as the security parameter, and is usually expressed as the size (in bits)
needed to represent the keys under different cryptosystems.
When originally presented, PGP worked with 384, 512 and 1024 bit keys.
500 bits for said keys achieve approximately the same entropy (thus security)
than 48 bits for symmetric encryption (Smart 2012) — Which is nowadays,
according to the same study, within reach for small organizations to break in a
very short term.
Throughout the years, both RSA and DSA key length has grown, and new
keys and certificates nowadays usually start at 2048 bits, with 4096 being the
norm. However, while for many years cryptography was used by very few people,
in the last fifteen years it became a fundamental part of the Internet. Keys and
certificates are no longer something seldom used, but something that affects all
users and businesses. Thus, old keys now have the need to be migrated — Or
rather, key users must be migrated from using shorter to using longer, unrelated
keys.
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This issue posed only a minor inconvenence for the public hierarchical Cer-
tificate Authorities model, as said authorities have demanded the certificates
submitted for signing to have a set expiry date, and it suffices for the author-
ity to change its policies not to accept keys below a certain length or using
the approved algorithms1 for its whole user base to migrate to stronger keys
after an expiry period; publicly trusted (this is, following the current versions
of the CA/Browser Forum recommendations) certificate authorities should not
issue certificates using said weaker algorithms after January 2016 (CA/Browser
Forum 2015).
It must be noted, however, that organizations can use either self-signed cer-
tificates or internal-use certificate authorities; an interesting case is exemplified
by the USA Department of Defense still issuing insecure certificates in January
2016 (Mutton 2016).
For the decentralized Web of trust model, however, it poses a much harder
problem: With no central entity able to preemptively limit a key’s validity, users
of short, vulnerable keys might still be using them years after they have been
determined as insecure. Unsuspecting third parties who trust users’ identity
will not be prompted into requiring stronger cryptographic material.
2.3 Measuring keys and keyrings
There are many measures by which any given key, or a keyring as a whole,
can be measured; the following are the most basic and simple reachability and
distance-based measurements (Penning 2006–2016):
Shortest distance Individual measure of a key pair. Taking any two keys in
the keyring, the length of the shortest path between them, irrespective of
whether they are part of the strong set; can be infinity in case no such path
exists. This measure is directonal : Trust paths (and thus their lengths)
from A to B can be different than from B to A.
Strong set Group measure within a keyring, the largest subset of keys between
which there is at least one trust path from each to all of the others; it can
be relevant either in absolute terms or as a percentage of the whole keyring.
Reachable set The union of the strong set and all of the keys that are reach-
able from it, although do not link back.
Mean shortest distance (MSD) Individual measure of any given key be-
longing to a set (usually, only the strong set is relevant for this measure).
It is the average of the shortest distances from all of the other keys in said
set.
1A problem analog to the one covered by this Section affects the widely used message
SHA-1 message digest algorithm. While said algorithmic vulnerability falls outside the scope
of the present work, the mitigation and migration processes are equivalent.
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Average mean shortest distance (AMSD) Global measure for any key set
(usually the strong set) of any given keyring. It is the average of the MSDs
of all of its keys.
3 The Debian project and its curated keyring
We now proceed to analyze the specifics for the keyring migration of the Debian
keyring: In first place, the specific context of the project at hand, and secondly
the experience and learnt lessons from said process.
3.1 The Debian project
The Debian project is one of the largest free software undertakings to date
(Debian Project 1997–2015), and has held this position for well over ten years
(González-Barahona et al. 2001; Amor et al. 2005). Founded in 1993, it is
also one of the longest lived free software projects still under active develop-
ment (Fernández-Sanguino et al. 2015). It has seen participation by over 5,500
contributors (Zini 2013–2016).
Debian is a very interesting social case study, as it exists merely as a work
group with no direct backing or financing company; all participation in Debian
is voluntary (although different companies do pay their employees full-time to
work on Debian) (Monga 2004). The mere social implications of this project
goal and self-definition have been studied at length from very different angles
(González de Requena Redondo 2010; Siobhán O’Mahony 2012; Coleman 2013).
The project is based upon a series of documents describing its goals and work
ethos, such as the Social Contract, Constitution and Policy (Debian Project
1997–2004; Debian Project 1998–2015; Debian Project 1996–2015); this has al-
lowed for the close to 1500 curent project maintainers and developers to be
globally distributed, as Figure 1 shows, although undoubtedly following a dis-
tribution closely related to the industrialized countries (Debian Project 2015).
Figure 1: Geographical distribution of Debian Developers (Debian Project 2015)
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Debian produces the largest Linux-based distribution, measured both in size
(with over 30,000 source packages, independent programs integrated for it) and
in adoption, particularly when its derivative distributions are also counted in
— Debian is the upstream distribution for Ubuntu, Mint, Kali, and literally
hundreds of other organized collections of free software (Byfield 2011; Lundqvist
and Rodic 2006–2012).
The project’s global dispersion, size and wide adoption are the main factors
for the importance of this study: Given the high responsability associated with
upload rights to Debian, any particular developer could potentially upload mal-
licious code, which would reach easily millions of computers, and would be run
with administrative privileges.
Such an abuse has not happened so far, and care is taken not to open the
window for any fraudulent activity of this type. This requires strong identity
assurance.
3.2 Strong identity assurance: A curated Web of Trust
The most widespread identification method worldwide is the old username-
password pair. This scheme, however secure it can be made, is just too weak
for today’s standards; even security-minded users tend to pick trivial passwords
(Burnett 2011) or repeat their use in unrelated servers, and even in the best
case, an alphanumeric keyboard-typable 10 character long password will not
yield enough entropy to be considered secure.
Cryptographic key certificates, as described in Section 2.1, allow for ex-
tremely improbable to be forgeable documents, validated by third parties (be it
in the CAs model or in the WoT model). The Debian project adds one further
step to the WoT model: A curatorship.
Besides asserting the identity of each project member, the Debian keyring-
maint team maintains a list of keys that define a set of keyrings, each of which
has an associated level of privileges in the project. Every Debian Developer,
both uploading and non-uploading (DD and DD-NU), and Debian Maintainer
(DM) should2 have a valid key in the corresponding keyring. keyring-maint
is also in charge of ensuring keyrings are kept up to date and ahead of any
weaknesses that can appear in the used public key cryptosystems.
The team also pushes to keep a high strong set ratio (see Section 2.3); al-
though exceptions to this rule are granted as required by the Debian Account
Managers, mainly on account creation (as Section 3.3 explains), the mere ex-
istence of a policy requiring two active DD signatures for every requested key
transition (Debian Project 1997–2014) has resulted in a more richly integrated
social aspect of the project, with keysigning being an important activity pursued
worldwide when Debian-related people meet.
Do note that the keyring-maint team’s work is hosted at a version-controlled
Git repository. While the master, working copy is not publicly available, a public
2Ideally, there should be a 1:1 relation between keys and people, but as we will soon
describe, for some time it has not necessarily been the case.
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copy of all of the committed work (which includes the full historic data used
as the source of information for this work) is available and can be cloned from
https://anonscm.debian.org/gitweb/?p=keyring/keyring.git
From what was presented so far, the main elements relevant to the present
work are:
• Debian is a geographically very disperse project, with no formal organiza-
tion behind it.
• Strong cryptographic identity validation is a must for the project’s nature.
• The standard cryptographic protocol over 20 years ago is no longer con-
siderable secure enough.
• Key migrations must be done preserving a strong identity trust: The
keyring-maint team requires two signatures from active DD keys to per-
form a key transition, unless requested to act otherwise by the Debian
Account Managers.
As Debian has grown, so has the number of developers. While back in
2000 the strong set spanned just about a hundred nodes (as can be seen in the
Developers keyring’s strong set depicted in Figure 2), it nowadays covers close
to 750.
Figure 2: Strong set in the Developers keyring of Debian in 2000, highlighting
the keys with highest centrality (Darxus 2002)
The Debian keyrings are mainly used by the project’s infrastructure; the
scripts that immediately determine if a package upload or a vote cast for a
General Resolution (GR) come from an authorized person do so by checking
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the keyrings; changing the password for logging in to the project servers is also
done via a signed message.
Keyrings are also available for system users to download, via the debian-
keyring package.
3.2.1 Defined keyrings
The team manages the following four active keyrings:3
Keyring Currently active keys corresponding to Debian Developers (uploading)
(DD). Before 2009, this was the only existing keyring, and with over 800
currently active keys, it is by far still the largest one.
Nonupload Currently active keys corresponding to Debian Developers (non-
uploading) (DD-NU). It is the smallest and youngest active keyring: It
was defined in late 2010, and as of this writing holds only 17 keys.
Maintainers Currently active keys corresponding to Debian Maintainers
(DM). It was defined in mid 2009, and currently holds 234 keys.
Role-keys Keys belonging to Debian teams, not individuals, such as the Secu-
rity team or the Debian CD.
From those four, only Keyring and Nonupload are considered as Debian
project members and, as such, sources of trust — This means that only the
signatures from keys belonging to keys in those keyrings are considered for
identity trust paths.
The following inactive keyrings are defined as well. Those keyrings hold keys
no longer active, but which are part of the project’s historic memory:
Emeritus Inactive keyring for former Debian Developers that have formally
retired from the project.
Removed-1024 Keys that were removed from the project as part of the process
presented in Section 4.2 and not yet replaced with a suitable longer key.
Removed Other keys that have been removed for various reasons during the
keyring’s history.
3.3 Curatorship and keyrings
Section 3.2 presents the need for the curatorship process in the Debian project.
This process is delineated by a set of well-defined actions resulting in a key
entering, leaving or changing status in one of the managed keyrings.
We characterize the work done with the Debian keyrings as a curatorship
as an analogy with the work done for art collections and exhibits. Quoting
Nauman and Kraynak (2005) on the role of the curator :
3This work does not attempt to describe the differences and relations between the different
Debian contributor types; further details can be found at (Debian Project 1997–2016).
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«(. . . ) The "somebody else" who is usually primarily responsible for
how and where a work of art is shown is the curator. The curator
selects a work for exhibition and makes decisions about the context
within which it will be displayed. This requires sensitivity to the in-
terests and intentions of the artist. The curator also needs to ensure
that the work is displayed in such a way that it is accessible and
meaningful to the public. Furthermore, curators working within a
museum environment, have an added responsibility to their institu-
tion. It is their role, along with conservators and art technicians,
to delineate a comprehensive and accurate record of the artwork for
the future.»
And quoting Eeds and Peterson (1991) on the role of a curator, the article
very adequately starts with the following paragraph:
«A curator knows art, collects it, cares for it, and delights in sharing
it with others, helping them see it in ways they may not have discov-
ered if left on their own. We choose this term for teachers who do
these things with literature, opening this way of knowing the world
to their students.»
Although not concerned with works of art or the relationship between content
creator and public, we present the curator as the person o team making the
difference between having a set of items and a collection of items: A collection
implies basic quality criteria to which all of its items conform, and a wholeness
or unity between them all.
The Debian keyring-maint team cares for the quality and meaningfulness of
the defined keyrings. This does not just mean trying to keep the keyrings’ strong
sets tight and AMSDs low (as defined in Section 2.3), but continuously evalu-
ating the changing conditions and challenges in the domain where the keyring
exists (the cryptographic algorithms and their implementation), centrally ensure
the trust conditions are not at risk of losing quality.
All in all, having a curated keyring in this context means maintaining and
applying a set of guidelines to keep a set of items (in this case, of PGP keys) as
a valuable collection.
Of course, adding this measure of control does bring the WoT model closer
to the centralized CA model: There is a single entity controlling the acceptance,
permanence and retirement of nodes. We hold the curatorship to be qualita-
tively different because it effectively separates the validation of a key’s identity
(stemming completely from the WoT) from the conformation of the accepted
key set (overseen by the keyring-maint team).
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4 Case study: The migration away from 1024-bit
keys in Debian
The different keyrings have been managed under a version control system since
mid 2008, so the baseline of our work can only track back to said date; we
can appreciate in the evolution of the percentage of the strong set respective
to the full developer keyring, shown in Figure 3, that connectedness has re-
mained almost constant thorughout the last seven years: Even though there is
an undeniable reduction and jitter at the end of this period due precisely to the
migration we are describing, the strong set has consistently remained between
82 and 89% of the full keyring.
Figure 3: Strong set (percentage of total) for the Developers keyring, 2008-2015:
82 to 89% of the total keyring
4.1 Earlier migrations: The PGPv3 keys removal
By 2014, it was clear that 1024-bit keys did not provide the security level re-
quired by the project and that the problem was big enough it would not be
solved by just calling attention to it, so a hard migration strategy with manda-
tory cutoff periods had to be sketched. This was not unprecedented: By 2010
and after a migration period slightly over a year (McDowell 2009), keyring-maint
managed to get all (yet) older PGPv3 keys to be retired due to weaknesses in
the MD5 message digest algorithm they used, as well as their short keylength.
As Figure 4 shows, when the drive away from PGPv3 keys started in 2008, close
to 240 developers had such keys, and it was until August 2010 that the number
was finally driven to zero.
There were core differences between that experience and the newer one.
Firstly, the amount of keys in need to be migrated was close to 20% of the
project’s membership.4 Secondly, a large percentage of old PGPv3 keys were
4As PGPv4-handling software was not yet mature at some stage, developers were allowed
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Figure 4: Migration away from the PGPv3 key format in the Developers keyring,
2008–2010
of effectively inactive developers. When a response request (WAT rounds) was
sent out by the Debian Account Managers, keys belonging to developers that
failed at all to answer to the mails were marked as disabled; the last "dip" of
the PGPv3 line, in August 2010, marks the necessary forceful removal of the
only 17 remaining active PGPv3 keys.
4.2 The 1024-bit keys removal
As Figure 5 shows, in early 2014, when the migration efforts started, the amount
of keys in need of migration was slightly over half of the active keyring. There
was already a downwards trend in it favoring stronger keys since attention was
first drawn to the matter in mid 2009, when it was close to the total amount of
keys in the keyring, but the pace was too slow for it to naturally converge.
At the annual Debian conference (DebConf 14) in Portland, Oregon, the
migration plan was announced: The full, final migration would be carried out
over the following six months, and a strong invitation would be sent to every
affected developer to upgrade their keys as soon as possible. A cutoff date was
set to January 1st, 2015, by which point all remaining keys would be disabled
and handled as not trusted. The keyring-maint team asked the approximately
200 developers attending the session to support the plan (which was received
with no opposition), and set on to implement it.
The response was overwhelmingly good; over the next six months, 266 key
replacement requests were successfully handled. Nevertheless, 252 keys had
to be removed, each of which means a developer effective losing the ability to
perform their Debian-related duties. One year later, the number of such keys
that have not yet been replaced remains at 227.
to have both a PGPv3 and PGPv4 keys.
12
Figure 5: Historical evolution of the Developers keyring, 2008-2016
5 Conclusions
Throughout this article, we have presented the curated Web of Trust model,
which, although is directly derived from the almost anarchic, transitive Web of
Trust, allows for the existance of a group of curators (in the case of Debian, the
keyring-maint team) that oversee and determine policies that the participating
keys must comply. This, of course, without falling into the opposite model,
the rigid and hierarchical Certificate Authorities model, that are based on the
vulnerable and not fully auditable ultimately trusted agents: In the curated Web
of Trust model, the curators’ keys get no different treatment than any other
member’s key; while keyring-maint members technically could alter their own
keys, given that the keyring is generated from a publicly available Git tree (see
Section 3.2), all changes are publicly logged and refered to the relevant request
tracker ticket, keeping full transparency and accountability.
The described model has long been used at the Debian project, proving a
natural fit due to the project’s geographically distributed, voluntary partici-
pation nature. Many of the project members will never have the opportunity
to mutually meet, but maintianing a large keyring (in the vicinity of 1000 in-
dependent keys) with a strong set spanning 82% to 89% of the set for eight
years shows that the model enables a stable path of trust to exist between most
project participants.
Finally, throughout the experience presented as the migration away from
weaker keys (shorter than 2048 bits), we sustain that, by setting a few clear
replacement requirements, this model is able to undergo large-scale transitions
without significantly losing inner connectivity. The keyring did suffer, as almost
one fourth of the keys had to be retired without their owners’ being yet able to
comply with the requirement, but the rate at which they are submitting their
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keys for inclusion one year after the migration was done (as shown in Figure
5) is clearly higher than the replacement race before the aggressive migration
started.
5.1 Future work
The present work has prompted us to look into several health aspects of the
Debian keyrings. While up to now the main curatorship criteria have been
strong enough cryptography and ensuring conectedness on new key additions,
further studying the keyring can bring up insights on new policies to adopt.
A natural match can be found between a deeper keyring analysis follow-
ing social network methodologies, with keys as nodes and trust signatures as
directed edges. Work is currently underway, and first results have presented
(Wolf 2016), on performing an aging and vitality analysis on the set of signa-
tures; with said work, the effect of not counting signatures over a given age
threshold will be better understood, and might allow to shape policies to ensure
the connections depicted by the strong set are actually socially meaningful, and
not just decade-old random signatures with no true current real meaning.
Of course, similar analysis could be run on different projects. While Debian
is the biggest identifiable project using a PGP Web of Trust (Cederlöf 2004),
many other large projects in the Free Software environment can be analyzed.
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